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Globalisation of crime: the 
electronic dimension
by Rosalind Wright
Continuing Sir Ivan Lawrence's theme, discussed in Issue 4 of Amicus Curiae, 
Rosalind Wright, Director of the Serious Fraud Office, looks at the issues from 
the electronic and technological viewpoint.
Y | ifre Independent recently described Internet banking as 'a
I criminal's dream'. A great army of Internet banking
JL. services linked with off-shore banking, with their layers of
secrecy through which drug money, bribes, proceeds of otherj o o -' ' r
major crime and untaxed millions can be moved with ease away 
from the prying eyes of the authorities, is marching over the 
electronic horizon, led by the likes of the European Union Bank, 
recently closed by regulators in Antigua. These entities are hard to 
pin down to a definable base; harder still to be able to sway the 
fly-by-nights, the crooks that set them up to prey on the unwary 
and the tax evader looking for an undetectable haven for black 
money.
COMPLICATING FACTOR
Frauds are increasingly multi-jurisdictional in scope. 80% of all cases 
investigated by the SFO during the 1996 97 reporting vear had a 
significant foreign element, involving more than one jurisdiction. The 
fact that every country constitutes a separate and distinct criminal 
jurisdiction is a complicating factor in any investigation.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
What can national regulators do to stem and crush this 
international epidemic of electronic predators?
One way is to persuade major banking centres which allow off- 
shore business corporations to set up, to recognise that legal 
professional privilege and banking secrecy laws which were 
established for the commercial protection of legitimate business, 
are a godsend for the criminal. Also, exceptions and exemptions 
to that secrecy should be much more readily allowed, to prevent 
exploitation and abuse by criminals. This applies as much to the 
traditional banking centres such as Switzerland, Liechtenstein and 
Austria   which maintain fierce banking secrecy legislation   of 
which advantage is taken only too often by international crooks, 
as to the newer centres springing up over the Caribbean and now- 
Eastern Europe too.
Another way is greater recognition of the importance of the 
checks and safeguards that money laundering controls provide and 
more muscular enforcement of their provisions by all powers
throughout the world. At present, money laundering directives 
apply to very few of the centres from which these new predators 
operate.
Eondon is, of course, the biggest international financial centre 
in the word and the biggest foreign exchange centre. 
Consequently, it is crucial that the UK leads the way when it 
comes to the regulation of financial markets and the criminal 
processes for fraudsters. Frauds are increasingly multi- 
jurisdictional in scope; 80% of all cases investigated by the Serious 
Fraud Office (SFO) during the 1996 97 reporting year had a 
significant foreign element, involving more than one jurisdiction. 
The fact that every country constitutes a separate and distinct 
criminal jurisdiction is a complicating factor in any investigation. 
Fraudsters exploit territorial boundaries and differing legal 
systems to make the process of investigation and prosecution 
more complicated and difficult. Internet fraud, in particular, is 
one aspect of the increasing internationalisation of economic 
crime.
THE ROLE OF THE SFO
What part does the SFO play in the fight against the 
international criminal?
Eord Roskill's fraud trials Report of 1986 (Fraud Trials Committee 
Report, HMSO 1986) led to the setting up of the SFO in the 
following year. His vision of a dedicated organisation, with a
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unique combination of lawyers and accountants working 
alongside police officers, has proved a durable and effective one.
The SFO fits into the post-Roskill architecture as a unique, 
focused agency with the task of investigating and prosecuting the 
tip of the fraud iceberg: those cases which are exceptionally 
serious and complex. This means that it is limited to a small 
number of very significant cases   at the moment 82 active cases 
are under investigation or going through the trial process. The 
combination of the investigation with the prosecution function 
enables 'precision tailoring' of enquiries in a major investigation at 
a much earlier stage than would be the case if the two functions 
were separated. The SFO model has been adopted by a number 
of overseas authorities   New Zealand, South Africa and Norway 
among them   for their own initiatives in tackling serious fraud.
ASSISTANCE TO OVERSEAS AUTHORITIES
Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 ('CJA'), which 
provides special, statutory powers enabling the SFO to compel 
the provision of information, has proved to be a vital tool in 
getting to the heart of complicated frauds. There is a limitation 
on the use of evidence, particularly admissions, obtained by use 
of these compulsory powers. In particular admissions obtained 
by compulsion cannot be used as primary evidence against the 
maker. Power to investigate on behalf of overseas authorities 
and to use the s. 2 powers to aid those authorities was extended 
(in February 1995) by s. 164 of the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994, amending the Criminal Justice (International Co- 
operation) Act 1990, to provide assistance in cases where the 
suspected fraud occurred abroad, but where there has been an 
involvement in this country. The Home Office retains the right 
to allow a statement (possibly an admission of the crime), 
compulsorily obtained by the SFO, to be used at a foreign trial 
in the same way that it could be used at a UK trial.
As the SFO's reputation in the fight against international 
crime continues to grow so does its overseas caseload. The 
number of requests received from foreign counterparts in the 
financial year 1996 97 grew to 57 from 35 the previous year. 
Of these, 54 were accepted from 19 countries. Examples of 
assistance provided include:
  Ex-Italian President Berlusconi: a much publicised mutual legal 
assistance case. The transfer of documents to Italy was 
unsuccessfully challenged by the lawyers acting for 
Berlusconi.
  Alan Bond: another mutual legal assistance case which has 
attracted some publicity. Alan Bond pleaded guilty to fraud 
charges after an investigation with which the SFO assisted.
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  Effex International: in December 1996, the former head of a 
London-based currency trading scheme, Mr Ostraat, was 
sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and fined £2.7m at 
Oslo Crown Court   the biggest sentence ever given for fraud
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in Norway   following an investigation involving close co- 
operation between the SFO and the Norwegian authorities.
With fraud becoming more international, sophisticated 
criminals are demonstrating their awareness of and readiness to 
take advantage of the disparity between the laws and regulations 
of different jurisdictions. It is therefore more important than 
ever to emphasise the importance of firm and workable treaties 
and gateways for mutual assistance (MLATs) and exchange of 
information between law enforcement agencies. There are a 
number of MLATs to which the UK is a signatory. The more 
treaties signed up to and the more gateways opened up across 
the world, the better, so that there is no safe haven for the 
international fraudster.
It is equally important to ensure quick, effective 
arrangements for extradition. Although matters have improved 
with countries party to the European Convention on 
Extradition there remains much that can be done to simplify 
the process. Also, extraterritorial prosecutions where countries 
refuse to extradite their own nationals are inappropriate in 
fraud cases. It is impracticable to try these cases in another 
jurisdiction; it leads to safe havens for fraudsters. The SFO is 
currently in the process of seeking the extradition of 
defendants from five jurisdictions in six separate cases; it has 
successfully secured the return to the UK of defendants in two 
major fraud cases (one, Abbas Gokal, in the BCCI case).
MORE CO-OPERATION ON THE HOME 
FRONT?
What about bringing together those in the UK with an interest 
in policing, regulating and prosecuting economic malpractice and 
crime?
Responsibility for different aspects of economic fraud and 
malpractice is, in the UK, divided between public bodies and 
regulatory organisations, whose powers to gather evidence, 
procedures and punishments all differ. The present structure is 
still fragmented and, because of that, not as efficient as one would 
wish.
The new Government's proposed changes in the area of City 
regulation will inevitably have an impact on the SFO's work. The 
Government's proposal to unify and consolidate the Financial 
Services Act regulators, is a welcome first stop towards tackling 
the problem of fragmentation. Bringing together under the 
Securities and Investments Board the banking supervisory 
function of the Bank of England, the building societies and, in due
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course, Lloyd's of London, is a significant advance. However, the 
strengthening and greater coherence of the regulatory capability 
highlights the difficulty faced by the criminal prosecuting 
authorities. The limitations imposed by the law, court procedures 
and need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused 
acted with dishonest intent, create problems in successfully 
bringing to book some of the most questionable conduct of a 
commercial nature.
CRITERIA FOR SFO INVESTIGATION
Criteria for acceptance of a case for investigation by the SFO as 
'serious or complex' include:
  the need to use s. 2 of the Criminal Justice Act powers
  significant international dimensions
  likelihood of widespread public concern
  need for highly specialised market knowledge
  normally, whether the sum at risk exceeds £lm
REGULATION V PROSECUTION
Is there a role lor the FSA to take over responsibility for 
policing and punishing by disciplinary process some cases of 
market manipulation or market abuse (including insider dealing) 
which have proved almost impossible to prosecute? The criminal 
prosecuting and investigating authorities, including the SFO, 
could then be left to tackle the more straightforward truly 
'criminal' cases.
First of all, it would be wrong to leave the most complicated 
cases solely with the regulators. What the SFO investigates and 
brings to court are criminal cases. That is, cases involving 
dishonesty, deceit, cheating, duplicity-   in a word   fraud. The 
regulators deal, or should deal, with unacceptable market 
conduct; that is, conduct below the standard one should come to 
expect in a well-run market. Some of the conduct they examine 
and discipline practitioners for is substandard because it is 
negligent; some, because it is unethical. Advantage has been taken 
of the unwary; there has been concealment of downside factors, 
of heavy commission charges; there has been 'churning'   tooJ o ' o
frequent trading to advantage the broker. Real dishonesty should 
not be the prcnince of the regulator. That is where the criminal 
authorities have their part to play.
Sec Susan Scott-Hunt s article on 
insider trading at p. 21
The regulator cannot really do more than take the offender off 
the road; deprive him of his licence to operate. That in itself is a 
very considerable weapon. In many cases, it is depriving a man of 
his livelihood, and a very lucrative livelihood at that. Where an 
investment house is taken off the road, it deprives all the 
employees, the innocent as well as the culpable, of their 
livelihoods as well. But where dishonesty is involved the public 
interest requires that a much more severe sanction, deprivation of 
liberty, is available and public anger is aroused where it feels that 
a rogue has cheated the public and 'got away with it'.
On the other hand, what are the pitfalls for the criminal 
prosecutor in tackling market misconduct and market abuse 
cases, even those which fall fairly and squarely within the category 
of dishonest behaviour?
THE JURY SYSTEM
There is the challenge of the jury system. The prosecutor strives 
to present a complex commercial fraud to a jury of lay people in 
a way that enables them to understand the intricacies of the 
commercial transactions and the documents (often the most 
convoluted and intricate sets of accounts). But this means having 
to prune a case to its bare essentials losing, in the process, 
substantial elements of the total criminality alleged.
Even more important than trying to make the case 
comprehensible for a lay panel, is the problem of manageability of 
a huge, unwieldy case. For each transaction or series of 
transactions, or agreements (conspiracies), there are often a 
number of different combinations of people and facts: hence a 
number of indictments, that is, a series of trials. If you split the 
case up into a number of separate units you run the risk of losing 
the total picture. You are also in danger of the 'Pandora Factor'   
the ruling by Buckley J to stop the second Maxwell trial in its 
tracks as 'unfair' on the accused   or, in this case, his wife. If you 
don't split them, you have an unmanageable monster of a case, 
like Blue Arrow, where convictions   and there were five 
convictions in that case   are overturned on appeal as, again 
'unfair'; this time on the jury, who were obliged to sit for over a 
year and deal with indictments against f 1 defendants.
One way in which a prosecuting authority can respond to these 
challenges is to make the management of the case as efficient as 
possible. Docman is a multi-million pound computer project that 
the SFO is in the process of introducing, designed to speed 
investigations and simplify trials. It is an image-based document 
management system that will handle the huge amounts of material 
received in the course of investigations and prosecutions.
Again, as a criminal prosecutor, there is the problem of 
identifying the dishonesty in arcane market practices. But, says the 
defence, possibly with some justification, 'everybody is doing it'   
or something like it   or, 'this is innovation and you are not 
allowing us to compete with our rivals in Japan, the USA, or 
Europe ...'. We have to find expert witnesses to explain to the 
jury that the conduct complained of is so totally beyond the pale 
of acceptability that the defendant must have known it was wrong 
and deceptive or dishonest. But you are treading warily in 
between the elephant traps.
TRIAL BY PROFESSIONAL PANEL
What is the alternative? Trial by a panel of seasoned market 
professionals, directed by a legal assessor or judge as chairman? 
That is the pattern of the present regulatory authorities and the 
Financial Services Tribunal that may be pressed into service for
the new unified regulator. A criminal tribunal, headed by a judge 
and advised by market professionals, has much to recommend it. 
The proceedings would certainly be curtailed: no need to try and 
explain at great length what a stock option is, or a rights issue, or 
a butterfly straddle.
Many people have reservations about such a change. There are 
lurking fears of defendants' human rights being undermined, even
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of the creation of an unjust tribunal, answerable only to itself. 
Conversely, if you are looking for convictions, would the tribunal 
deliver the goods? Not necessarily is the answer. The fact is that 
the civil standard of proof applied by the financial services 
tribunals is very close to the criminal one, when it comes to 
serious allegations (market manipulation is very serious), or severe 
sanctions (deriving someone of their livelihood is very severe). A 
tribunal is as likely as jury to give a defendant the benefit of the 
doubt and is as prone to be swayed by persuasive and powerful 
advocacy. There are some exceptionally able and persuasive 
advocates at the commercial bar who would never set foot in a 
criminal court.
There is the great disadvantage that the regulatory tribunals are 
not confined to looking for dishonesty. They do and should look for 
bad behaviour: unsuitable advice, shoddy controls, a lack of due 
care and diligence. That is where the regulator truly shines. There 
is no need to prove criminality. That is not their function. If you 
are looking to save public money, again, the regulatory route 
certainly is the one to take. No call on the publtc purse, unless you 
count the indirect cost to the investor who will have his charges 
and commissions slightly increased by his stockbroker the next 
time he buys shares, to pay for the huge fines and costs. The 
regulator is financed by the financial services industry and will 
continue to be so in the future. But will they be able to deliver the 
large fines as well as take licences away in the context of a civil, 
regulatory tribunal, rather than a criminal court, where the 
safeguards of not incriminating yourself, the presumption of 
innocence and the highest standard of proof all apply?
IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE?
These approaches   the regulatory and the criminal are starkly 
divided. Is there an alternative?
Where criminal conduct coincides with regulatory misconduct, 
the authorities could respond imaginatively, by combining 
regulatory and criminal penalties in one tribunal. A 'one-stop 
shop' approach would enhance the effectiveness of both criminal 
and regulatory authorities by giving the flexibility to dispense 
penalties which are appropriate to the crimes committed.
Greater flexibility should be introduced in the criminal 
prosecution and trial of serious and complex fraud, the bulk of 
which falls, in any event, outside the presently regulated sector. 
Criminal judges could be armed with some of the regulatory tools 
that have proved of such benefit in investment regulation, 
including intervention powers to close down or suspend 
businesses suspected of being fraudulently run. Punitive fines 
could be imposed and fraudsters disqualified from taking part in 
any activity involving the soliciting or managing of investments by 
the public.
A strengthened criminal process is not a substitute for effective 
non-criminal regulation. The regulator has a very necessary and 
distinct role to play and the advantage of a civil standard of proof 
when enforcing its rules. There will, however, be cases where joint 
investigations with a regulator can be conducted to the benefit of 
both. On other occasions, different aspects of the same matter
will require separate inquiries. These could be made more 
effective by widening the 'gateways' between the SFO and the 
regulators.
COMMENDABLE SPEED
The Law Commission and the Government acted with commendable 
speed to plug the gap left by the Preddy case, with the Theft (Amendment) 
Act 1996, which amended s. 15 and 22 of the 1968 Act.
There is plenty of scope for improvement within the criminal 
justice system itself. In spite of the SFOs efforts to cut the number 
of charges and concentrate firepower on the key defendant to 
reduce the time taken to get cases to the point of transfer or 
committal, trials have still taken too long. More intense efforts on 
these fronts, coupled with energetic case management by the trial 
judges, will pay off in terms of shorter and more focused trials. 
Moving towards a new 'fraud' offence, to replace the plethora of 
statutory and common law dishonesty and conspiracy offences 
concerning similar types of fraudulent behaviour, will also help. 
The SFO is working with other government departments with a 
prosecuting function to put forward ideas to the Law Commission 
to reform the law in this area.
Lastly, reverting to the technological element. Law enforcers 
must ensure that the regulations and procedures move with the
times and with the technology. Technology must never be allowed 
to race ahead so that the law is limping behind to catch up. This 
is the lesson of the Preddy case (R v Preddy St^Anor, R v Dhillon [ 1996] 
3 WLR 225 (HL)), where an alleged fraud, which involved the use 
of a now everyday procedure   the electronic bank transfer of 
funds   was held by the House of Lords to be outside the ambit 
of s. 15 of the Theft Acts. The section in question requires proof 
of obtaining property; the point was that although one chose in 
action was lessened or extinguished and another created or 
increased, no property actually passed.
It sounds laughable that such a technical point can bring what 
appeared to be criminal conduct outside the law It is actually a 
very regrettable instance of the law not keeping pace with the 
technology. The law must be sufficiently flexible and forward 
looking to cover dishonesty in all its guises. This is why we have 
argued long and hard for the flexibility that an offence of 'fraud' 
would give. The law cannot be allowed to be, or to look, an ass.
With the experience of nine years of operation of both the SFO 
and the financial Services Act, we can look to more imaginative ways 
of tackling fraud that even Roskill imagined. $9
Rosalind Wright
Director, The Serious Fraud Office
Securities Transactions in Europe
A practical overview of securities transactions
Written as a 'first-stop' guide for anyone 
involved in cross-border securities 
transactions, Securities Transactions in 
Europe provides an overview of the national 
systems and regulatory environments 
governing the securities markets in key 
European countries.
Benefits to you
/ Information is provided to enable you to ask 
the 'right questions' and understand the 
implications of the answers provided
/ Transaction-based, the service offers 
invaluable guidance to ensure that you 
comply with best practice
S Each country division is similarly structured, 
so once you are familiar with one country, 
you are familiar with them all - saving 
valuable time
/ A Key Points section at the start of each 
country division provides you with a 
convenient list of points for each of the other 
standard chapters within that division
Comprehensive Coverage in one volume
Building to coverage of ten key European 
countries, the service provides comprehensive 












*The service will be expanded in subsequent updates 
by the addition of these countries.
One loose-leaf volume, four updates each year 
Regular issues of a practical newsletter, 
including articles and coverage of recent 
developments
£362 year one. Call CCH Customer Services on 
+44 (0) 1869 253300 or fax +44 (0) 1869 874700
to arrange your 28-day trial or to place your 
order.
